Communicating sentiment and outlook reverses inaction against collective risks

dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage17650eng
dc.bibliographicCitation.issue30eng
dc.bibliographicCitation.lastPage17655eng
dc.bibliographicCitation.volume117eng
dc.contributor.authorWang, Zhen
dc.contributor.authorJusup, Marko
dc.contributor.authorGuo, Hao
dc.contributor.authorShi, Lei
dc.contributor.authorGeček, Sunčana
dc.contributor.authorAnand, Madhur
dc.contributor.authorPerc, Matjaž
dc.contributor.authorBauch, Chris T.
dc.contributor.authorKurths, Jürgen
dc.contributor.authorBoccaletti, Stefano
dc.contributor.authorSchellnhuber, Hans Joachim
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-14T13:03:35Z
dc.date.available2021-12-14T13:03:35Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractCollective risks permeate society, triggering social dilemmas in which working toward a common goal is impeded by selfish interests. One such dilemma is mitigating runaway climate change. To study the social aspects of climate-change mitigation, we organized an experimental game and asked volunteer groups of three different sizes to invest toward a common mitigation goal. If investments reached a preset target, volunteers would avoid all consequences and convert their remaining capital into monetary payouts. In the opposite case, however, volunteers would lose all their capital with 50% probability. The dilemma was, therefore, whether to invest one's own capital or wait for others to step in. We find that communicating sentiment and outlook helps to resolve the dilemma by a fundamental shift in investment patterns. Groups in which communication is allowed invest persistently and hardly ever give up, even when their current investment deficits are substantial. The improved investment patterns are robust to group size, although larger groups are harder to coordinate, as evidenced by their overall lower success frequencies. A clustering algorithm reveals three behavioral types and shows that communication reduces the abundance of the free-riding type. Climate-change mitigation, however, is achieved mainly by cooperator and altruist types stepping up and increasing contributions as the failure looms. Meanwhile, contributions from free riders remain flat throughout the game. This reveals that the mechanisms behind avoiding collective risks depend on an interaction between behavioral type, communication, and timing.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedVersioneng
dc.identifier.urihttps://oa.tib.eu/renate/handle/123456789/7738
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.34657/6785
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherWashington, DC : National Acad. of Scienceseng
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1922345117
dc.relation.essn1091-6490
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117 (2020), Nr. 30eng
dc.rights.licenseCC BY 4.0 Unportedeng
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/eng
dc.subjectclimate changeeng
dc.subjectfree ridingeng
dc.subjectgroup sizeeng
dc.subjectnegotiationeng
dc.subjectsocial dilemmaeng
dc.subject.ddc000eng
dc.subject.ddc500eng
dc.titleCommunicating sentiment and outlook reverses inaction against collective riskseng
dc.typearticleeng
dc.typeTexteng
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journalTitleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of Americaeng
tib.accessRightsopenAccesseng
wgl.contributorPIKeng
wgl.subjectBiowissensschaften/Biologieeng
wgl.typeZeitschriftenartikeleng
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