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Stochastic mean payoff games: Smoothed analysis and approximation schemes

2010, Boros, Endre, Elbassioni, Khaled, Fouz, Mahmoud, Gurvich, Vladimir, Makino, Kazuhisa, Manthey, Bodo

We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information modeled by a digraph with black, white, and random vertices. These BWR-games games are polynomially equivalent with the classical Gillette games, which include many well-known subclasses, such as cyclic games, simple stochastic games, stochastic parity games, and Markov decision processes. They can also be used to model parlor games such as Chess or Backgammon. It is a long-standing open question whether a polynomial algorithm exists that solves BWR-games. In fact, a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for these games with an arbitrary number of random nodes would already imply their polynomial solvability. Currently, only two classes are known to have such a pseudo-polynomial algorithm: BW-games (the case with no random nodes) and ergodic BWR-games (i.e., in which the game's value does not depend on the initial position) with constant number of random nodes. In this paper, we show that the existence of a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for BWR-games with constant number of random vertices implies smoothed polynomial time complexity and the existence of absolute and relative polynomial-time approximation schemes. In particular, we obtain smoothed polynomial time complexity and derive absolute and relative approximation schemes for the above two classes.

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On canonical forms for two-person zero-sum limit average payoff stochastic games

2011, Boros, Endre, Elbassioni, Khaled, Gurvich, Vladimir, Makino, Kazuhisa

We consider two-person zero-sum mean payoff undiscounted stochastic games. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a saddle point in uniformly optimal stationary strategies. Namely, we obtain sufficient conditions that enable us to to bring the game, by applying potential transformations to a canonical form in which locally optimal strategies are globally optimal, and hence the value for every initial position and the optimal strategies of both players can be obtained by playing the local game at each state. We show that this condition is satisfied by the class of additive transition games, that is, the special case when the transitions at each state can be decomposed into two parts, each controlled completely by one of the two players. An important special case of additive games is the so-called BWR-games which are played by two players on a directed graph with positions of three types: Black, White and Random. We given an independent proof for the existence of canonical form in such games, and use this to derive the existence of canonical form (and hence of a saddle point in uniformly optimal stationary strategies) in a wide class of games, which includes stochastic games with perfect information, switching controller games and additive rewards, additive transition games.