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- ItemProjecting Antarctica's contribution to future sea level rise from basal ice shelf melt using linear response functions of 16 ice sheet models (LARMIP-2)(Göttingen : Copernicus Publ., 2020) Levermann, Anders; Winkelmann, Ricarda; Albrecht, Torsten; Goelzer, Heiko; Golledge, Nicholas R.; Greve, Ralf; Huybrechts, Philippe; Jordan, Jim; Leguy, Gunter; Martin, Daniel; Morlighem, Mathieu; Pattyn, Frank; Pollard, David; Quiquet, Aurelien; Rodehacke, Christian; Seroussi, Helene; Sutter, Johannes; Zhang, Tong; Van Breedam, Jonas; Calov, Reinhard; DeConto, Robert; Dumas, Christophe; Garbe, Julius; Gudmundsson, G. Hilmar; Hoffman, Matthew J.; Humbert, Angelika; Kleiner, Thomas; Lipscomb, William H.; Meinshausen, Malte; Ng, Esmond; Nowicki, Sophie M.J.; Perego, Mauro; Price, Stephen F.; Saito, Fuyuki; Schlegel, Nicole-Jeanne; Sun, Sainan; van de Wal, Roderik S.W.The sea level contribution of the Antarctic ice sheet constitutes a large uncertainty in future sea level projections. Here we apply a linear response theory approach to 16 state-of-the-art ice sheet models to estimate the Antarctic ice sheet contribution from basal ice shelf melting within the 21st century. The purpose of this computation is to estimate the uncertainty of Antarctica's future contribution to global sea level rise that arises from large uncertainty in the oceanic forcing and the associated ice shelf melting. Ice shelf melting is considered to be a major if not the largest perturbation of the ice sheet's flow into the ocean. However, by computing only the sea level contribution in response to ice shelf melting, our study is neglecting a number of processes such as surface-mass-balance-related contributions. In assuming linear response theory, we are able to capture complex temporal responses of the ice sheets, but we neglect any self-dampening or self-amplifying processes. This is particularly relevant in situations in which an instability is dominating the ice loss. The results obtained here are thus relevant, in particular wherever the ice loss is dominated by the forcing as opposed to an internal instability, for example in strong ocean warming scenarios. In order to allow for comparison the methodology was chosen to be exactly the same as in an earlier study (Levermann et al., 2014) but with 16 instead of 5 ice sheet models. We include uncertainty in the atmospheric warming response to carbon emissions (full range of CMIP5 climate model sensitivities), uncertainty in the oceanic transport to the Southern Ocean (obtained from the time-delayed and scaled oceanic subsurface warming in CMIP5 models in relation to the global mean surface warming), and the observed range of responses of basal ice shelf melting to oceanic warming outside the ice shelf cavity. This uncertainty in basal ice shelf melting is then convoluted with the linear response functions of each of the 16 ice sheet models to obtain the ice flow response to the individual global warming path. The model median for the observational period from 1992 to 2017 of the ice loss due to basal ice shelf melting is 10.2 mm, with a likely range between 5.2 and 21.3 mm. For the same period the Antarctic ice sheet lost mass equivalent to 7.4mm of global sea level rise, with a standard deviation of 3.7mm (Shepherd et al., 2018) including all processes, especially surface-mass-balance changes. For the unabated warming path, Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 (RCP8.5), we obtain a median contribution of the Antarctic ice sheet to global mean sea level rise from basal ice shelf melting within the 21st century of 17 cm, with a likely range (66th percentile around the mean) between 9 and 36 cm and a very likely range (90th percentile around the mean) between 6 and 58 cm. For the RCP2.6 warming path, which will keep the global mean temperature below 2 °C of global warming and is thus consistent with the Paris Climate Agreement, the procedure yields a median of 13 cm of global mean sea level contribution. The likely range for the RCP2.6 scenario is between 7 and 24 cm, and the very likely range is between 4 and 37 cm. The structural uncertainties in the method do not allow for an interpretation of any higher uncertainty percentiles.We provide projections for the five Antarctic regions and for each model and each scenario separately. The rate of sea level contribution is highest under the RCP8.5 scenario. The maximum within the 21st century of the median value is 4 cm per decade, with a likely range between 2 and 9 cm per decade and a very likely range between 1 and 14 cm per decade. © Author(s) 2020.
- ItemNational contributions for decarbonizing the world economy in line with the G7 agreement(Bristol : IOP Publishing, 2016) du Pont, Yann Robiou; Jeffery, M. Louise; Gütschow, Johannes; Christoff, Peter; Meinshausen, MalteIn June 2015, the G7 agreed to two global mitigation goals: 'a decarbonization of the global economy over the course of this century' and 'the upper end of the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommendation of 40%–70% reductions by 2050 compared to 2010'. These IPCC recommendations aim to preserve a likely (>66%) chance of limiting global warming to 2 °C but are not necessarily consistent with the stronger ambition of the subsequent Paris Agreement of 'holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels'. The G7 did not specify global or national emissions scenarios consistent with its own agreement. Here we identify global cost-optimal emissions scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models that match the G7 agreement. These scenarios have global 2030 emissions targets of 11%–43% below 2010, global net negative CO2 emissions starting between 2056 and 2080, and some exhibit net negative greenhouse gas emissions from 2080 onwards. We allocate emissions from these global scenarios to countries according to five equity approaches representative of the five equity categories presented in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (IPCCAR5): 'capability', 'equality', 'responsibility-capability-need', 'equal cumulative per capita' and 'staged approaches'. Our results show that G7 members' Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDCs) mitigation targets are in line with a grandfathering approach but lack ambition to meet various visions of climate justice. The INDCs of China and Russia fall short of meeting the requirements of any allocation approach. Depending on how their INDCs are evaluated, the INDCs of India and Brazil can match some equity approaches evaluated in this study.
- ItemThe shared socio-economic pathway (SSP) greenhouse gas concentrations and their extensions to 2500(Katlenburg-Lindau : Copernicus, 2020) Meinshausen, Malte; Nicholls, Zebedee R. J.; Lewis, Jared; Gidden, Matthew J.; Vogel, Elisabeth; Freund, Mandy; Beyerle, Urs; Gessner, Claudia; Nauels, Alexander; Bauer, Nico; Canadell, Josep G.; Daniel, John S.; John, Andrew; Krummel, Paul B.; Luderer, Gunnar; Meinshausen, Nicolai; Montzka, Stephen A.; Rayner, Peter J.; Reimann, Stefan; Smith, Steven J.; van den Berg, Marten; Velders, Guus J. M.; Vollmer, Martin K.; Wang, Ray H. J.Anthropogenic increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations are the main driver of current and future climate change. The integrated assessment community has quantified anthropogenic emissions for the shared socio-economic pathway (SSP) scenarios, each of which represents a different future socio-economic projection and political environment. Here, we provide the greenhouse gas concentrations for these SSP scenarios – using the reduced-complexity climate–carbon-cycle model MAGICC7.0. We extend historical, observationally based concentration data with SSP concentration projections from 2015 to 2500 for 43 greenhouse gases with monthly and latitudinal resolution. CO2 concentrations by 2100 range from 393 to 1135 ppm for the lowest (SSP1-1.9) and highest (SSP5-8.5) emission scenarios, respectively. We also provide the concentration extensions beyond 2100 based on assumptions regarding the trajectories of fossil fuels and land use change emissions, net negative emissions, and the fraction of non-CO2 emissions. By 2150, CO2 concentrations in the lowest emission scenario are approximately 350 ppm and approximately plateau at that level until 2500, whereas the highest fossil-fuel-driven scenario projects CO2 concentrations of 1737 ppm and reaches concentrations beyond 2000 ppm by 2250. We estimate that the share of CO2 in the total radiative forcing contribution of all considered 43 long-lived greenhouse gases increases from 66 % for the present day to roughly 68 % to 85 % by the time of maximum forcing in the 21st century. For this estimation, we updated simple radiative forcing parameterizations that reflect the Oslo Line-By-Line model results. In comparison to the representative concentration pathways (RCPs), the five main SSPs (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5) are more evenly spaced and extend to lower 2100 radiative forcing and temperatures. Performing two pairs of six-member historical ensembles with CESM1.2.2, we estimate the effect on surface air temperatures of applying latitudinally and seasonally resolved GHG concentrations. We find that the ensemble differences in the March–April–May (MAM) season provide a regional warming in higher northern latitudes of up to 0.4 K over the historical period, latitudinally averaged of about 0.1 K, which we estimate to be comparable to the upper bound (∼5 % level) of natural variability. In comparison to the comparatively straight line of the last 2000 years, the greenhouse gas concentrations since the onset of the industrial period and this studies' projections over the next 100 to 500 years unequivocally depict a “hockey-stick” upwards shape. The SSP concentration time series derived in this study provide a harmonized set of input assumptions for long-term climate science analysis; they also provide an indication of the wide set of futures that societal developments and policy implementations can lead to – ranging from multiple degrees of future warming on the one side to approximately 1.5 ∘C warming on the other.
- ItemReduced Complexity Model Intercomparison Project Phase 1: introduction and evaluation of global-mean temperature response(Katlenburg-Lindau : Copernicus, 2020) Nicholls, Zebedee R. J.; Meinshausen, Malte; Lewis, Jared; Gieseke, Robert; Dommenget, Dietmar; Dorheim, Kalyn; Fan, Chen-Shuo; Fuglestvedt, Jan S.; Gasser, Thomas; Golüke, Ulrich; Goodwin, Philip; Hartin, Corinne; Hope, Austin P.; Kriegler, Elmar; Leach, Nicholas J.; Marchegiani, Davide; McBride, Laura A.; Quilcaille, Yann; Rogelj, Joeri; Salawitch, Ross J.; Samset, Bjørn H.; Sandstad, Marit; Shiklomanov, Alexey N.; Skeie, Ragnhild B.; Smith, Christopher J.; Smith, Steve; Tanaka, Katsumasa; Tsutsui, Junichi; Xie, ZhiangReduced-complexity climate models (RCMs) are critical in the policy and decision making space, and are directly used within multiple Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports to complement the results of more comprehensive Earth system models. To date, evaluation of RCMs has been limited to a few independent studies. Here we introduce a systematic evaluation of RCMs in the form of the Reduced Complexity Model Intercomparison Project (RCMIP). We expect RCMIP will extend over multiple phases, with Phase 1 being the first. In Phase 1, we focus on the RCMs' global-mean temperature responses, comparing them to observations, exploring the extent to which they emulate more complex models and considering how the relationship between temperature and cumulative emissions of CO2 varies across the RCMs. Our work uses experiments which mirror those found in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), which focuses on complex Earth system and atmosphere–ocean general circulation models. Using both scenario-based and idealised experiments, we examine RCMs' global-mean temperature response under a range of forcings. We find that the RCMs can all reproduce the approximately 1 ∘C of warming since pre-industrial times, with varying representations of natural variability, volcanic eruptions and aerosols. We also find that RCMs can emulate the global-mean temperature response of CMIP models to within a root-mean-square error of 0.2 ∘C over a range of experiments. Furthermore, we find that, for the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP)-based scenario pairs that share the same IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)-consistent stratospheric-adjusted radiative forcing, the RCMs indicate higher effective radiative forcings for the SSP-based scenarios and correspondingly higher temperatures when run with the same climate settings. In our idealised setup of RCMs with a climate sensitivity of 3 ∘C, the difference for the ssp585–rcp85 pair by 2100 is around 0.23∘C(±0.12 ∘C) due to a difference in effective radiative forcings between the two scenarios. Phase 1 demonstrates the utility of RCMIP's open-source infrastructure, paving the way for further phases of RCMIP to build on the research presented here and deepen our understanding of RCMs.
- ItemWarming assessment of the bottom-up Paris Agreement emissions pledges([London] : Nature Publishing Group UK, 2018) Robiou du Pont, Yann; Meinshausen, MalteUnder the bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement, countries pledge Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Current NDCs individually align, at best, with divergent concepts of equity and are collectively inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. We show that the global 2030-emissions of NDCs match the sum of each country adopting the least-stringent of five effort-sharing allocations of a well-below 2 °C-scenario. Extending such a self-interested bottom-up aggregation of equity might lead to a median 2100-warming of 2.3 °C. Tightening the warming goal of each country’s effort-sharing approach to aspirational levels of 1.1 °C and 1.3 °C could achieve the 1.5 °C and well-below 2 °C-thresholds, respectively. This new hybrid allocation reconciles the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement with its top-down warming thresholds and provides a temperature metric to assess NDCs. When taken as benchmark by other countries, the NDCs of India, the EU, the USA and China lead to 2.6 °C, 3.2 °C, 4 °C and over 5.1 °C warmings, respectively.
- ItemImpact of short-lived non-CO2 mitigation on carbon budgets for stabilizing global warming(Bristol : IOP Publishing, 2015) Rogelj, Joeri; Meinshausen, Malte; Schaeffer, Michiel; Knutti, Reto; Riahi, KeywanLimiting global warming to any level requires limiting the total amount of CO2 emissions, or staying within a CO2 budget. Here we assess how emissions from short-lived non-CO2 species like methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), black-carbon, and sulphates influence these CO2 budgets. Our default case, which assumes mitigation in all sectors and of all gases, results in a CO2 budget between 2011–2100 of 340 PgC for a >66% chance of staying below 2°C, consistent with the assessment of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Extreme variations of air-pollutant emissions from black-carbon and sulphates influence this budget by about ±5%. In the hypothetical case of no methane or HFCs mitigation—which is unlikely when CO2 is stringently reduced—the budgets would be much smaller (40% or up to 60%, respectively). However, assuming very stringent CH4 mitigation as a sensitivity case, CO2 budgets could be 25% higher. A limit on cumulative CO2 emissions remains critical for temperature targets. Even a 25% higher CO2 budget still means peaking global emissions in the next two decades, and achieving net zero CO2 emissions during the third quarter of the 21st century. The leverage we have to affect the CO2 budget by targeting non-CO2 diminishes strongly along with CO2 mitigation, because these are partly linked through economic and technological factors.
- ItemZero emission targets as long-term global goals for climate protection(Bristol : IOP Publishing, 2015) Rogelj, Joeri; Schaeffer, Michiel; Meinshausen, Malte; Knutti, Reto; Alcamo, Joseph; Riahi, Keywan; Hare, WilliamRecently, assessments have robustly linked stabilization of global-mean temperature rise to the necessity of limiting the total amount of emitted carbon-dioxide (CO2). Halting global warming thus requires virtually zero annual CO2 emissions at some point. Policymakers have now incorporated this concept in the negotiating text for a new global climate agreement, but confusion remains about concepts like carbon neutrality, climate neutrality, full decarbonization, and net zero carbon or net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Here we clarify these concepts, discuss their appropriateness to serve as a long-term global benchmark for achieving temperature targets, and provide a detailed quantification. We find that with current pledges and for a likely (>66%) chance of staying below 2 °C, the scenario literature suggests net zero CO2 emissions between 2060 and 2070, with net negative CO2 emissions thereafter. Because of residual non-CO2 emissions, net zero is always reached later for total GHG emissions than for CO2. Net zero emissions targets are a useful focal point for policy, linking a global temperature target and socio-economic pathways to a necessary long-term limit on cumulative CO2 emissions.
- ItemMitigation choices impact carbon budget size compatible with low temperature goals(Bristol : IOP Publishing, 2015) Rogelj, Joeri; Reisinger, Andy; McCollum, David L.; Knutti, Reto; Riahi, Keywan; Meinshausen, MalteGlobal-mean temperature increase is roughly proportional to cumulative emissions of carbon-dioxide (CO2). Limiting global warming to any level thus implies a finite CO2 budget. Due to geophysical uncertainties, the size of such budgets can only be expressed in probabilistic terms and is further influenced by non-CO2 emissions. We here explore how societal choices related to energy demand and specific mitigation options influence the size of carbon budgets for meeting a given temperature objective. We find that choices that exclude specific CO2 mitigation technologies (like Carbon Capture and Storage) result in greater costs, smaller compatible CO2 budgets until 2050, but larger CO2 budgets until 2100. Vice versa, choices that lead to a larger CO2 mitigation potential result in CO2 budgets until 2100 that are smaller but can be met at lower costs. In most cases, these budget variations can be explained by the amount of non-CO2 mitigation that is carried out in conjunction with CO2, and associated global carbon prices that also drive mitigation of non-CO2 gases. Budget variations are of the order of 10% around their central value. In all cases, limiting warming to below 2 °C thus still implies that CO2 emissions need to be reduced rapidly in the coming decades.
- ItemEconomic mitigation challenges: How further delay closes the door for achieving climate targets(Bristol : IOP Publishing, 2013) Luderer, Gunnar; Pietzcker, Robert C.; Bertram, Christoph; Kriegler, Elmar; Meinshausen, Malte; Edenhofer, OttmarWhile the international community aims to limit global warming to below 2 ° C to prevent dangerous climate change, little progress has been made towards a global climate agreement to implement the emissions reductions required to reach this target. We use an integrated energy–economy–climate modeling system to examine how a further delay of cooperative action and technology availability affect climate mitigation challenges. With comprehensive emissions reductions starting after 2015 and full technology availability we estimate that maximum 21st century warming may still be limited below 2 ° C with a likely probability and at moderate economic impacts. Achievable temperature targets rise by up to ~0.4 ° C if the implementation of comprehensive climate policies is delayed by another 15 years, chiefly because of transitional economic impacts. If carbon capture and storage (CCS) is unavailable, the lower limit of achievable targets rises by up to ~0.3 ° C. Our results show that progress in international climate negotiations within this decade is imperative to keep the 2 ° C target within reach.
- ItemSynthesizing long-term sea level rise projections – the MAGICC sea level model v2.0(München : European Geopyhsical Union, 2017) Nauels, Alexander; Meinshausen, Malte; Mengel, Matthias; Lorbacher, Katja; Wigley, Tom M.L.Sea level rise (SLR) is one of the major impacts of global warming; it will threaten coastal populations, infrastructure, and ecosystems around the globe in coming centuries. Well-constrained sea level projections are needed to estimate future losses from SLR and benefits of climate protection and adaptation. Process-based models that are designed to resolve the underlying physics of individual sea level drivers form the basis for state-of-the-art sea level projections. However, associated computational costs allow for only a small number of simulations based on selected scenarios that often vary for different sea level components. This approach does not sufficiently support sea level impact science and climate policy analysis, which require a sea level projection methodology that is flexible with regard to the climate scenario yet comprehensive and bound by the physical constraints provided by process-based models. To fill this gap, we present a sea level model that emulates global-mean long-term process-based model projections for all major sea level components. Thermal expansion estimates are calculated with the hemispheric upwelling-diffusion ocean component of the simple carbon-cycle climate model MAGICC, which has been updated and calibrated against CMIP5 ocean temperature profiles and thermal expansion data. Global glacier contributions are estimated based on a parameterization constrained by transient and equilibrium process-based projections. Sea level contribution estimates for Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are derived from surface mass balance and solid ice discharge parameterizations reproducing current output from ice-sheet models. The land water storage component replicates recent hydrological modeling results. For 2100, we project 0.35 to 0.56m (66% range) total SLR based on the RCP2.6 scenario, 0.45 to 0.67m for RCP4.5, 0.46 to 0.71m for RCP6.0, and 0.65 to 0.97m for RCP8.5. These projections lie within the range of the latest IPCC SLR estimates. SLR projections for 2300 yield median responses of 1.02m for RCP2.6, 1.76m for RCP4.5, 2.38m for RCP6.0, and 4.73m for RCP8.5. The MAGICC sea level model provides a flexible and efficient platform for the analysis of major scenario, model, and climate uncertainties underlying long-term SLR projections. It can be used as a tool to directly investigate the SLR implications of different mitigation pathways and may also serve as input for regional SLR assessments via component-wise sea level pattern scaling.