Search Results
Scientific assessments to facilitate deliberative policy learning
Putting the recently adopted global Sustainable Development Goals or the Paris Agreement on international climate policy into action will require careful policy choices. Appropriately informing decision-makers about longer-term, wicked policy issues remains a considerable challenge for the scientific community. Typically, these vital policy issues are highly uncertain, value-laden and disputed, and affect multiple temporal and spatial scales, governance levels, policy fields, and socioeconomic contexts simultaneously. In light of this, science-policy interfaces should help facilitate learning processes and open deliberation among all actors involved about potentially acceptable policy pathways. For this purpose, science-policy interfaces must strive to foster some enabling conditions: (1) “representation” in terms of engaging with diverse stakeholders (including experts) and acknowledging divergent viewpoints; (2) “empowerment” of underrepresented societal groups by co-developing and integrating policy scenarios that reflect their specific knowledge systems and worldviews; (3) “capacity building” regarding methods and skills for integration and synthesis, as well as through the provision of knowledge synthesis about the policy solution space; and (4) “spaces for deliberation”, facilitating direct interaction between different stakeholders, including governments and scientists. We argue that integrated, multi-stakeholder, scientific assessment processes—particularly the collaborative assessments of policy alternatives and their various implications—offer potential advantages in this regard, compared with alternatives for bridging scientific expertise and public policy. This article is part of a collection on scientific advice to governments.
What is important for achieving 2 °C? UNFCCC and IPCC expert perceptions on obstacles and response options for climate change mitigation
Global mitigation efforts remain insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C. While a growing academic literature analyzes this problem, perceptions of which obstacles inhibit goal attainment and which responses might be most effective seem to differ widely. This makes prioritization and agreement on the way forward difficult. To inform prioritization in global climate policy and research agendas, we present quantitative data on how 917 experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC perceive the importance of different obstacles and response options for achieving 2 °C. On average, respondents consider opposition from special interest groups the most important obstacle and technological R&D the most important response. Our survey also finds that the majority of experts perceives a wide range of issues as important, supporting an agenda that is inclusive in terms of coverage. Average importance ratings differ between experts from the Global North and South, suggesting that balanced representation in global fora and regionally differentiated agendas are important. In particular, opposition from special interest groups is a top priority among experts from North America, Europe and Oceania. Investigating the drivers of individual importance ratings, we find little difference between experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC, while expert's perceptions correlate with their academic training and their national scientific, regulatory, and financial contexts.
Making or breaking climate targets: The AMPERE study on staged accession scenarios for climate policy
This study explores a situation of staged accession to a global climate policy regime from the current situation of regionally fragmented and moderate climate action. The analysis is based on scenarios in which a front runner coalition – the EU or the EU and China – embarks on immediate ambitious climate action while the rest of the world makes a transition to a global climate regime between 2030 and 2050. We assume that the ensuing regime involves strong mitigation efforts but does not require late joiners to compensate for their initially higher emissions. Thus, climate targets are relaxed, and although staged accession can achieve significant reductions of global warming, the resulting climate outcome is unlikely to be consistent with the goal of limiting global warming to 2 degrees. The addition of China to the front runner coalition can reduce pre-2050 excess emissions by 20–30%, increasing the likelihood of staying below 2 degrees. Not accounting for potential co-benefits, the cost of front runner action is found to be lower for the EU than for China. Regions that delay their accession to the climate regime face a trade-off between reduced short term costs and higher transitional requirements due to larger carbon lock-ins and more rapidly increasing carbon prices during the accession period.
The social cost of carbon and inequality: When local redistribution shapes global carbon prices
The social cost of carbon is a central metric for optimal carbon prices. Previous literature shows that inequality significantly influences the social cost of carbon, but mostly omits heterogeneity below the national level. We present an optimal taxation model of the social cost of carbon that accounts for inequality between and within countries. We find that climate and distributional policy can generally not be separated. If only one country does not compensate low-income households for disproportionate damages, the social cost of carbon tends to increase globally. Optimal carbon prices remain roughly unchanged if national redistribution leaves inequality between households unaffected by climate change and if the utility of households is approximately logarithmic in consumption.
The strategic dimension of financing global public goods
One challenge in addressing transboundary problems such as climate change is the incentive to free-ride. Transfers from multilateral compensation funds are often used to counteract such incentives, albeit with varying success. We examine how such funds can change the incentive to free-ride in a global public-goods game. In our game, self-interested countries choose their own preferred course, deciding their voluntary public good provision, whether to join a fund that offers compensation for providing the public good and the volume of compensatory payments. We show that (i) total public-good provision is higher when those contributing are given more compensation; and (ii) non-participation in the fund can be punished if the remaining members decrease their public-good provision sufficiently. We then examine three specific fund designs. In the first, the compensation paid to each country is equal to the percentage of above-average total costs for public-goods provision. This design is best able to deter free-riding and can establish the social optimum as the equilibrium. In the second, the compensation paid to each country is a function of the marginal cost of their public-good provision. Here there are significant incentives to free-ride. In the third case, the monetary resources provided by the fund are fixed, a design frequently encountered in international funds. This design is the one least able to deter free-riding. © 2020 The Author(s)
Locked into Copenhagen pledges - Implications of short-term emission targets for the cost and feasibility of long-term climate goals
This paper provides an overview of the AMPERE modeling comparison project with focus on the implications of near-term policies for the costs and attainability of long-term climate objectives. Nine modeling teams participated in the project to explore the consequences of global emissions following the proposed policy stringency of the national pledges from the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agreements to 2030. Specific features compared to earlier assessments are the explicit consideration of near-term 2030 emission targets as well as the systematic sensitivity analysis for the availability and potential of mitigation technologies. Our estimates show that a 2030 mitigation effort comparable to the pledges would result in a further “lock-in” of the energy system into fossil fuels and thus impede the required energy transformation to reach low greenhouse-gas stabilization levels (450 ppm CO2e). Major implications include significant increases in mitigation costs, increased risk that low stabilization targets become unattainable, and reduced chances of staying below the proposed temperature change target of 2 °C in case of overshoot. With respect to technologies, we find that following the pledge pathways to 2030 would narrow policy choices, and increases the risks that some currently optional technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) or the large-scale deployment of bioenergy, will become “a must” by 2030.
Reviewing the Market Stability Reserve in light of more ambitious EU ETS emission targets
The stringency of the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS) is bound to be ratcheted-up to deliver on more ambitious goals as formulated in the EU's Green Deal. Tightening the cap needs to consider the interactions with the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), which will be reviewed in 2021. We analyse these issues using the model LIMES-EU. First, we examine how revising MSR parameters impacts allowance cancellations. We find that varying key design parameters leads to cancellations in the range of 2.6–7.9 Gt – compared to 5.1 Gt under current regulation. Overall, the bank thresholds, which define when there is intake to/outtake from the MSR, have the highest impact. Intake rates above 12% only have a limited effect, and cause oscillatory intake behaviour. Second, we analyse how more ambitious climate 2030 targets can be achieved by adjusting the linear reduction factor (LRF). We find that the LRF increases MSR cancellations substantially up to 10.0 Gt. This implies that increasing its value from currently 2.2% to only 2.6% could be consistent with an EU-wide target of −55% by 2030. However, MSR cancellations are subject to large uncertainty, which increases the complexity of the market and induces high price uncertainty.
Introduction to the AMPERE model intercomparison studies on the economics of climate stabilization
[No abstract available]