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- ItemAlternative carbon price trajectories can avoid excessive carbon removal([London] : Nature Publishing Group UK, 2021) Strefler, Jessica; Kriegler, Elmar; Bauer, Nico; Luderer, Gunnar; Pietzcker, Robert C.; Giannousakis, Anastasis; Edenhofer, OttmarThe large majority of climate change mitigation scenarios that hold warming below 2 °C show high deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), resulting in a peak-and-decline behavior in global temperature. This is driven by the assumption of an exponentially increasing carbon price trajectory which is perceived to be economically optimal for meeting a carbon budget. However, this optimality relies on the assumption that a finite carbon budget associated with a temperature target is filled up steadily over time. The availability of net carbon removals invalidates this assumption and therefore a different carbon price trajectory should be chosen. We show how the optimal carbon price path for remaining well below 2 °C limits CDR demand and analyze requirements for constructing alternatives, which may be easier to implement in reality. We show that warming can be held at well below 2 °C at much lower long-term economic effort and lower CDR deployment and therefore lower risks if carbon prices are high enough in the beginning to ensure target compliance, but increase at a lower rate after carbon neutrality has been reached.
- ItemOptimal carbon taxation and horizontal equity: A welfare-theoretic approach with application to German household data(Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2022) Hänsel, Martin C.; Franks, Max; Kalkuhl, Matthias; Edenhofer, OttmarWe develop a model of optimal taxation and redistribution under an ambitious climate target. We take into account vertical income differences, but also explicitly capture horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and second-best rules for policy instruments including carbon and labor taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we investigate analytically how vertical and horizontal inequality is considered in the welfare maximizing tax structure. We calibrate the model to German household data and a 30 percent emission reduction goal and show that redistribution of carbon tax revenues via household-specific transfers is the first-best policy. Under plausible assumptions on inequality aversion, transfers to energy-intensive households should be about five times higher than transfers to energy-efficient households. Equal per-capita transfers do not require to observe households’ efficiency type, but increase equity-weighted mitigation costs by around 5 percent compared to the first-best. Mitigation costs increase by less, if the government can implement a uniform clean energy subsidy or household-specific tax-subsidy schemes on energy consumption and labor income that target heterogeneous energy efficiencies. Horizontal equity concerns may therefore constitute a new second-best rationale for clean energy policies or differentiated energy taxes.
- ItemThe social cost of carbon and inequality: When local redistribution shapes global carbon prices(Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2021) Kornek, Ulrike; Klenert, David; Edenhofer, Ottmar; Fleurbaey, MarcThe social cost of carbon is a central metric for optimal carbon prices. Previous literature shows that inequality significantly influences the social cost of carbon, but mostly omits heterogeneity below the national level. We present an optimal taxation model of the social cost of carbon that accounts for inequality between and within countries. We find that climate and distributional policy can generally not be separated. If only one country does not compensate low-income households for disproportionate damages, the social cost of carbon tends to increase globally. Optimal carbon prices remain roughly unchanged if national redistribution leaves inequality between households unaffected by climate change and if the utility of households is approximately logarithmic in consumption.
- ItemPigou in the 21st Century: a tribute on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of The Economics of Welfare(New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2021) Edenhofer, Ottmar; Franks, Max; Kalkuhl, MatthiasThe year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou’s magnum opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou’s pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou’s contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost–benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government’s 2019 climate policy reform and the EU’s Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice.
- ItemReviewing the Market Stability Reserve in light of more ambitious EU ETS emission targets(Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2021) Osorio, Sebastian; Tietjen, Oliver; Pahle, Michael; Pietzcker, Robert C.; Edenhofer, OttmarThe stringency of the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS) is bound to be ratcheted-up to deliver on more ambitious goals as formulated in the EU's Green Deal. Tightening the cap needs to consider the interactions with the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), which will be reviewed in 2021. We analyse these issues using the model LIMES-EU. First, we examine how revising MSR parameters impacts allowance cancellations. We find that varying key design parameters leads to cancellations in the range of 2.6–7.9 Gt – compared to 5.1 Gt under current regulation. Overall, the bank thresholds, which define when there is intake to/outtake from the MSR, have the highest impact. Intake rates above 12% only have a limited effect, and cause oscillatory intake behaviour. Second, we analyse how more ambitious climate 2030 targets can be achieved by adjusting the linear reduction factor (LRF). We find that the LRF increases MSR cancellations substantially up to 10.0 Gt. This implies that increasing its value from currently 2.2% to only 2.6% could be consistent with an EU-wide target of −55% by 2030. However, MSR cancellations are subject to large uncertainty, which increases the complexity of the market and induces high price uncertainty.
- ItemWhat is important for achieving 2 °C? UNFCCC and IPCC expert perceptions on obstacles and response options for climate change mitigation(Bristol : IOP Publ., 2020) Kornek, Ulrike; Flachsland, Christian; Kardish, Chris; Levi, Sebastian; Edenhofer, OttmarGlobal mitigation efforts remain insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C. While a growing academic literature analyzes this problem, perceptions of which obstacles inhibit goal attainment and which responses might be most effective seem to differ widely. This makes prioritization and agreement on the way forward difficult. To inform prioritization in global climate policy and research agendas, we present quantitative data on how 917 experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC perceive the importance of different obstacles and response options for achieving 2 °C. On average, respondents consider opposition from special interest groups the most important obstacle and technological R&D the most important response. Our survey also finds that the majority of experts perceives a wide range of issues as important, supporting an agenda that is inclusive in terms of coverage. Average importance ratings differ between experts from the Global North and South, suggesting that balanced representation in global fora and regionally differentiated agendas are important. In particular, opposition from special interest groups is a top priority among experts from North America, Europe and Oceania. Investigating the drivers of individual importance ratings, we find little difference between experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC, while expert's perceptions correlate with their academic training and their national scientific, regulatory, and financial contexts.
- ItemThe strategic dimension of financing global public goods(Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2020) Kornek, Ulrike; Edenhofer, OttmarOne challenge in addressing transboundary problems such as climate change is the incentive to free-ride. Transfers from multilateral compensation funds are often used to counteract such incentives, albeit with varying success. We examine how such funds can change the incentive to free-ride in a global public-goods game. In our game, self-interested countries choose their own preferred course, deciding their voluntary public good provision, whether to join a fund that offers compensation for providing the public good and the volume of compensatory payments. We show that (i) total public-good provision is higher when those contributing are given more compensation; and (ii) non-participation in the fund can be punished if the remaining members decrease their public-good provision sufficiently. We then examine three specific fund designs. In the first, the compensation paid to each country is equal to the percentage of above-average total costs for public-goods provision. This design is best able to deter free-riding and can establish the social optimum as the equilibrium. In the second, the compensation paid to each country is a function of the marginal cost of their public-good provision. Here there are significant incentives to free-ride. In the third case, the monetary resources provided by the fund are fixed, a design frequently encountered in international funds. This design is the one least able to deter free-riding. © 2020 The Author(s)