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- ItemProjecting Antarctica's contribution to future sea level rise from basal ice shelf melt using linear response functions of 16 ice sheet models (LARMIP-2)(Göttingen : Copernicus Publ., 2020) Levermann, Anders; Winkelmann, Ricarda; Albrecht, Torsten; Goelzer, Heiko; Golledge, Nicholas R.; Greve, Ralf; Huybrechts, Philippe; Jordan, Jim; Leguy, Gunter; Martin, Daniel; Morlighem, Mathieu; Pattyn, Frank; Pollard, David; Quiquet, Aurelien; Rodehacke, Christian; Seroussi, Helene; Sutter, Johannes; Zhang, Tong; Van Breedam, Jonas; Calov, Reinhard; DeConto, Robert; Dumas, Christophe; Garbe, Julius; Gudmundsson, G. Hilmar; Hoffman, Matthew J.; Humbert, Angelika; Kleiner, Thomas; Lipscomb, William H.; Meinshausen, Malte; Ng, Esmond; Nowicki, Sophie M.J.; Perego, Mauro; Price, Stephen F.; Saito, Fuyuki; Schlegel, Nicole-Jeanne; Sun, Sainan; van de Wal, Roderik S.W.The sea level contribution of the Antarctic ice sheet constitutes a large uncertainty in future sea level projections. Here we apply a linear response theory approach to 16 state-of-the-art ice sheet models to estimate the Antarctic ice sheet contribution from basal ice shelf melting within the 21st century. The purpose of this computation is to estimate the uncertainty of Antarctica's future contribution to global sea level rise that arises from large uncertainty in the oceanic forcing and the associated ice shelf melting. Ice shelf melting is considered to be a major if not the largest perturbation of the ice sheet's flow into the ocean. However, by computing only the sea level contribution in response to ice shelf melting, our study is neglecting a number of processes such as surface-mass-balance-related contributions. In assuming linear response theory, we are able to capture complex temporal responses of the ice sheets, but we neglect any self-dampening or self-amplifying processes. This is particularly relevant in situations in which an instability is dominating the ice loss. The results obtained here are thus relevant, in particular wherever the ice loss is dominated by the forcing as opposed to an internal instability, for example in strong ocean warming scenarios. In order to allow for comparison the methodology was chosen to be exactly the same as in an earlier study (Levermann et al., 2014) but with 16 instead of 5 ice sheet models. We include uncertainty in the atmospheric warming response to carbon emissions (full range of CMIP5 climate model sensitivities), uncertainty in the oceanic transport to the Southern Ocean (obtained from the time-delayed and scaled oceanic subsurface warming in CMIP5 models in relation to the global mean surface warming), and the observed range of responses of basal ice shelf melting to oceanic warming outside the ice shelf cavity. This uncertainty in basal ice shelf melting is then convoluted with the linear response functions of each of the 16 ice sheet models to obtain the ice flow response to the individual global warming path. The model median for the observational period from 1992 to 2017 of the ice loss due to basal ice shelf melting is 10.2 mm, with a likely range between 5.2 and 21.3 mm. For the same period the Antarctic ice sheet lost mass equivalent to 7.4mm of global sea level rise, with a standard deviation of 3.7mm (Shepherd et al., 2018) including all processes, especially surface-mass-balance changes. For the unabated warming path, Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 (RCP8.5), we obtain a median contribution of the Antarctic ice sheet to global mean sea level rise from basal ice shelf melting within the 21st century of 17 cm, with a likely range (66th percentile around the mean) between 9 and 36 cm and a very likely range (90th percentile around the mean) between 6 and 58 cm. For the RCP2.6 warming path, which will keep the global mean temperature below 2 °C of global warming and is thus consistent with the Paris Climate Agreement, the procedure yields a median of 13 cm of global mean sea level contribution. The likely range for the RCP2.6 scenario is between 7 and 24 cm, and the very likely range is between 4 and 37 cm. The structural uncertainties in the method do not allow for an interpretation of any higher uncertainty percentiles.We provide projections for the five Antarctic regions and for each model and each scenario separately. The rate of sea level contribution is highest under the RCP8.5 scenario. The maximum within the 21st century of the median value is 4 cm per decade, with a likely range between 2 and 9 cm per decade and a very likely range between 1 and 14 cm per decade. © Author(s) 2020.
- ItemThe economically optimal warming limit of the planet(Göttingen : Copernicus Publ., 2019) Ueckerd, Falko; Frieler, Katja; Lange, Stefan; Wenz, Leonie; Luderer, Gunnar; Levermann, AndersBoth climate-change damages and climate-change mitigation will incur economic costs. While the risk of severe damages increases with the level of global warming (Dell et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014b, 2018; Lenton et al., 2008), mitigating costs increase steeply with more stringent warming limits (IPCC, 2014a; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2015). Here, we show that the global warming limit that minimizes this century's total economic costs of climate change lies between 1.9 and 2°C, if temperature changes continue to impact national economic growth rates as observed in the past and if instantaneous growth effects are neither compensated nor amplified by additional growth effects in the following years. The result is robust across a wide range of normative assumptions on the valuation of future welfare and inequality aversion. We combine estimates of climate-change impacts on economic growth for 186 countries (applying an empirical damage function from Burke et al., 2015) with mitigation costs derived from a state-of-the-art energy-economy-climate model with a wide range of highly resolved mitigation options (Kriegler et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2013, 2015). Our purely economic assessment, even though it omits non-market damages, provides support for the international Paris Agreement on climate change. The political goal of limiting global warming to "well below 2 degrees" is thus also an economically optimal goal given above assumptions on adaptation and damage persistence. © 2019 Copernicus GmbH. All rights reserved.
- ItemFreshwater resources under success and failure of the Paris climate agreement(Göttingen : Copernicus Publ., 2019) Heinke, Jens; Müller, Christoph; Lannerstad, Mats; Gerten, Dieter; Lucht, WolfgangPopulation growth will in many regions increase the pressure on water resources and likely increase the number of people affected by water scarcity. In parallel, global warming causes hydrological changes which will affect freshwater supply for human use in many regions. This study estimates the exposure of future population to severe hydrological changes relevant from a freshwater resource perspective at different levels of global mean temperature rise above pre-industrial level (ΔTglob). The analysis is complemented by an assessment of water scarcity that would occur without additional climate change due to population change alone; this is done to identify the population groups that are faced with particularly high adaptation challenges. The results are analysed in the context of success and failure of implementing the Paris Agreement to evaluate how climate mitigation can reduce the future number of people exposed to severe hydrological change. The results show that without climate mitigation efforts, in the year 2100 about 4.9 billion people in the SSP2 population scenario would more likely than not be exposed to severe hydrological change, and about 2.1 billion of them would be faced with particularly high adaptation challenges due to already prevailing water scarcity. Limiting warming to 2 °C by a successful implementation of the Paris Agreement would strongly reduce these numbers to 615 million and 290 million, respectively. At the regional scale, substantial water-related risks remain at 2 °C, with more than 12% of the population exposed to severe hydrological change and high adaptation challenges in Latin America and the Middle East and north Africa region. Constraining δTglob to 1.5 °C would limit this share to about 5% in these regions. ©2019 Author(s).
- Item“Surface,” “satellite” or “simulation”: Mapping intra-urban microclimate variability in a desert city(Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, 2020) Zhou, Bin; Kaplan, Shai; Peeters, Aviva; Kloog, Itai; Erell, EvyatarMapping spatial and temporal variability of urban microclimate is pivotal for an accurate estimation of the ever-increasing exposure of urbanized humanity to global warming. This particularly concerns cities in arid/semi-arid regions which cover two fifths of the global land area and are home to more than one third of the world's population. Focusing on the desert city of Be'er Sheva Israel, we investigate the spatial and temporal patterns of urban–rural and intra-urban temperature variability by means of satellite observation, vehicular traverse measurement, and computer simulation. Our study reveals a well-developed nocturnal canopy layer urban heat island in Be'er Sheva, particularly in the winter, but a weak diurnal cool island in the mid-morning. Near surface air temperature exhibits weak urban–rural and intra-urban differences during the daytime (<1°C), despite pronounced urban surface cool islands observed in satellite images. This phenomenon, also recorded in some other desert cities, is explained by the rapid increase in surface skin temperature of exposed desert soils (in the absence of vegetation or moisture) after sunrise, while urban surfaces are heated more slowly. The study highlights differences among the three methods used for describing urban temperature variability, each of which may have different applications in fields such as urban planning, climate change mitigation, and epidemiological research. © 2019 The Authors. International Journal of Climatology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of the Royal Meteorological Society.
- ItemProjecting Exposure to Extreme Climate Impact Events Across Six Event Categories and Three Spatial Scales(Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 2020) Lange, Stefan; Volkholz, Jan; Geiger, Tobias; Zhao, Fang; Vega, Iliusi; Veldkamp, Ted; Reyer, Christopher P.O.; Warszawski, Lila; Huber, Veronika; Jägermeyr, Jonas; Schewe, Jacob; Bresch, David N.; Büchner, Matthias; Chang, Jinfeng; Ciais, Philippe; Dury, Marie; Emanuel, Kerry; Folberth, Christian; Gerten, Dieter; Gosling, Simon N.; Grillakis, Manolis; Hanasaki, Naota; Henrot, Alexandra-Jane; Hickler, Thomas; Honda, Yasushi; Ito, Akihiko; Khabarov, Nikolay; Koutroulis, Aristeidis; Liu, Wenfeng; Müller, Christoph; Nishina, Kazuya; Ostberg, Sebastian; Müller Schmied, Hannes; Seneviratne, Sonia I.; Stacke, Tobias; Steinkamp, Jörg; Thiery, Wim; Wada, Yoshihide; Willner, Sven; Yang, Hong; Yoshikawa, Minoru; Yue, Chao; Frieler, KatjaThe extent and impact of climate-related extreme events depend on the underlying meteorological, hydrological, or climatological drivers as well as on human factors such as land use or population density. Here we quantify the pure effect of historical and future climate change on the exposure of land and population to extreme climate impact events using an unprecedentedly large ensemble of harmonized climate impact simulations from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project phase 2b. Our results indicate that global warming has already more than doubled both the global land area and the global population annually exposed to all six categories of extreme events considered: river floods, tropical cyclones, crop failure, wildfires, droughts, and heatwaves. Global warming of 2°C relative to preindustrial conditions is projected to lead to a more than fivefold increase in cross-category aggregate exposure globally. Changes in exposure are unevenly distributed, with tropical and subtropical regions facing larger increases than higher latitudes. The largest increases in overall exposure are projected for the population of South Asia. ©2020. The Authors.
- ItemSignificance of uncertain phasing between the onsets of stadial–interstadial transitions in different Greenland ice core proxies(Katlenburg-Lindau : Copernicus Ges., 2021) Riechers, Keno; Boers, NiklasDifferent paleoclimate proxy records evidence repeated abrupt climate transitions during previous glacial intervals. These transitions are thought to comprise abrupt warming and increase in local precipitation over Greenland, sudden reorganization of the Northern Hemisphere atmospheric circulation, and retreat of sea ice in the North Atlantic. The physical mechanism underlying these so-called Dansgaard–Oeschger (DO) events remains debated. A recent analysis of Greenland ice core proxy records found that transitions in Na+ concentrations and δ18O values are delayed by about 1 decade with respect to corresponding transitions in Ca2+ concentrations and in the annual layer thickness during DO events. These delays are interpreted as a temporal lag of sea-ice retreat and Greenland warming with respect to a synoptic- and hemispheric-scale atmospheric reorganization at the onset of DO events and may thereby help constrain possible triggering mechanisms for the DO events. However, the explanatory power of these results is limited by the uncertainty of the transition onset detection in noisy proxy records. Here, we extend previous work by testing the significance of the reported lags with respect to the null hypothesis that the proposed transition order is in fact not systematically favored. If the detection uncertainties are averaged out, the temporal delays in the δ18O and Na+ transitions with respect to their counterparts in Ca2+ and the annual layer thickness are indeed pairwise statistically significant. In contrast, under rigorous propagation of uncertainty, three statistical tests cannot provide evidence against the null hypothesis. We thus confirm the previously reported tendency of delayed transitions in the δ18O and Na+ concentration records. Yet, given the uncertainties in the determination of the transition onsets, it cannot be decided whether these tendencies are truly the imprint of a prescribed transition order or whether they are due to chance. The analyzed set of DO transitions can therefore not serve as evidence for systematic lead–lag relationships between the transitions in the different proxies, which in turn limits the power of the observed tendencies to constrain possible physical causes of the DO events.