The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

dc.bibliographicCitation.date2018
dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage828
dc.bibliographicCitation.issue7
dc.bibliographicCitation.journalTitleClimate Policyeng
dc.bibliographicCitation.lastPage838
dc.bibliographicCitation.volume18
dc.contributor.authorSprinz, Detlef F.
dc.contributor.authorSælen, Håkon
dc.contributor.authorUnderdal, Arild
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jon
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-16T13:46:07Z
dc.date.available2023-01-16T13:46:07Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractOn 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedVersioneng
dc.identifier.urihttps://oa.tib.eu/renate/handle/123456789/10871
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34657/9897
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAbingdon : Taylor & Francis
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1410090
dc.relation.essn1752-7457
dc.relation.issn1469-3062
dc.rights.licenseCC BY 4.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.subject.ddc550
dc.subject.otherClimate clubseng
dc.subject.otherclub goodseng
dc.subject.otherconditional commitmenteng
dc.subject.othermitigationeng
dc.subject.otherParis Agreementeng
dc.subject.otherside-paymentseng
dc.subject.otherTrump administrationeng
dc.subject.otherUSeng
dc.titleThe effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trumpeng
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.typeTexteng
tib.accessRightsopenAccess
wgl.contributorPIK
wgl.subjectGeowissenschaftenger
wgl.typeZeitschriftenartikelger
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